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    skyrider223

    @skyrider223

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    Best posts made by skyrider223

    • Add security checks #488

      Hello,

      Actually, i’m working on a usable FOS client working on Secure Boot, based on signed Clonezilla Linux kernel.
      (with GRUB-signed + shim for PXE chainloading)

      In a attempt of make a wrapper for GRUB (like bootmenu.class.php), i discovered in bootmenu.class.php :

      Everybody on the network where FOG Server is connected (even if the server is connected on Internet) can

      • Delete a host
      • Update a product key
      • Join a multicast session
      • Approve a host (which can lead to an AD credential leak)

      The only prerequisites are to known the mac address of a computer present in the FOG Database.

      In the commit proposed, it changes the behavior of how iPXE handles the user and password throughout multiples #iPXE scripts, and ensures at all times an action is authenticated, event if the command is “internal” (delconf/sessname/key/aprvconf)

      Theses lines ensures username and password parameters to be kept in RAM during the iPXE phase && re-transmitted (if defined):

      'param username ${username}',
      'param password ${password}',
      

      PS : I’m sorry @Sebastian-Roth for my (very) late reply.

      https://github.com/FOGProject/fogproject/pull/488

      posted in Bug Reports
      skyrider223S
      skyrider223

    Latest posts made by skyrider223

    • Add security checks #488

      Hello,

      Actually, i’m working on a usable FOS client working on Secure Boot, based on signed Clonezilla Linux kernel.
      (with GRUB-signed + shim for PXE chainloading)

      In a attempt of make a wrapper for GRUB (like bootmenu.class.php), i discovered in bootmenu.class.php :

      Everybody on the network where FOG Server is connected (even if the server is connected on Internet) can

      • Delete a host
      • Update a product key
      • Join a multicast session
      • Approve a host (which can lead to an AD credential leak)

      The only prerequisites are to known the mac address of a computer present in the FOG Database.

      In the commit proposed, it changes the behavior of how iPXE handles the user and password throughout multiples #iPXE scripts, and ensures at all times an action is authenticated, event if the command is “internal” (delconf/sessname/key/aprvconf)

      Theses lines ensures username and password parameters to be kept in RAM during the iPXE phase && re-transmitted (if defined):

      'param username ${username}',
      'param password ${password}',
      

      PS : I’m sorry @Sebastian-Roth for my (very) late reply.

      https://github.com/FOGProject/fogproject/pull/488

      posted in Bug Reports
      skyrider223S
      skyrider223