@masterofus said in Security concerns:
I’ve lurked the forums searching for NFS security to find answers. Maybe I’m wrong, I don’t know?
- NFS is faster
- No security needed in intranet
- Don’t put FOG on the public side
- Use an IP filter or limit IPs in exportfile
- SMB is slower and not native to Linux
I can not refute anything you found. It is as you listed. NFSv3 is insecure (more on this later). That is why a FOG server should never be connected to a public internet.
What are the solutions ? You’d think students would not try anything but in fact they will.
Especially CS students.
- Are the DD images crypted on the fly ?
The image files are not encrypted, but they are compressed/decompressed dynamically. You can’t just technically read the file and get anything of value out. Consider that this is a disk sector copy, with block crc hashing, that is compressed and packed into a partition based image file. Its not a simple as a straight DD dump. If you knew what you were doing, could you extract the disk image, Yes. If you knew what you were doing, could you mount the extracted partitions, yes. So what would you have? FOG is not a backup solution.
So I just have to say this part, so what if someone gets a copy of the image? What harm will it cause? There should be no PII or user created data in it. It should be just a clean image. So what are the risks. We want to make sure we put the effort into the project where its going to return the best results based on the investment of time.
- Is there a way to hide, on screen, the NFS path used when deploying ? That way, you can randomize a NFS folder. (security thru obscurity)
Hiding the NFS path, that’s possible since if its printed, the print command can be removed. We’d have to identify where in the imaging process its being displayed. Can you randomize the nfs folder, no since nfs doesn’t work that way. You would have to restart the nfs server on the fog server every time you wanted to change the export path.
If you only allowed imaging from a specific network, yes you could add the IP filters on the nfs export to limit who could connect to the nfs share.
I’m just trying to secure the image depot and it’s strange nobody cares ? Maybe the users don’t know their files aren’t secure at all?
You have to consider that the majority of the sites that use FOG is for windows based imaging, not linux. So in the case of NFS, MS Windows is a bit ignorant of the protocol (yes I know you can add services to allow NFS). So since windows can’t nativly communicate with an NFS share then that data is pretty protected. As well if the windows box does get ahold of the image file, they will have a 25GB blob. What will they do with it? In the linux world, someone with the intent and a bit of skill could extract the image file.
Now one of the things I experimented with was NFSv4. I have imaged computers with NFSv4. The structure of NFSv4 is a bit different than v3 so its not a straight migration but it can be done. Moving to NFSv4 would go a long way to increase the security of the FOG imaging, plus make creating firewall rules much easier since nfsv4 uses a single data port for communications.
So the final thought is this. What you have pointed out is definitely a flaw in the FOG imaging environment, here in the year 2022. Security should be the primary focus. But with limited developer resources at the moment some of these advanced security features are on the roadmap but not being actively implemented.